Nahid Chowdhury
Rajshahi University
Bangladesh is struggling for breath. When Summit LNG Terminal resumed supplying the national grid on the evening of 14 August 2026, starting at roughly 110 million cubic feet per day and expected to reach around 550 mmcfd by early Saturday, it offered only a brief flicker of relief amid what has become a persistent energy crisis. Yet that flicker reveals more than it fixes. The fact that a single terminal going offline for under twenty four hours can paralyze the nation’s industries, power plants, and households exposes a fragility that no incremental increase in supply can truly resolve.
The Roots of the Crisis
Bangladesh’s gas crisis is not a sudden event but the outcome of decades of structural neglect. The country’s once robust indigenous natural gas reserves have steadily declined, as exploration investment failed to keep pace with growing demand and successive governments prioritized consumption over new discovery. By the time the extent of depletion became undeniable, the gap between domestic supply and national need had already outgrown what local fields could cover.
The shift to imported LNG, while necessary, proved deeply vulnerable. Bangladesh built two floating storage and regasification units off Moheshkhali, operated by Summit Group and Excelerate Energy, designed to receive, store, and regasify LNG for pipeline delivery, but with minimal redundancy. When Summit’s unit ran out of LNG on Thursday afternoon, supply tightened almost immediately, compounded by Excelerate’s terminal already operating below capacity due to a technical fault. Two partial failures at two facilities were enough to disrupt the entire nation, revealing not resilience but a single point of failure masquerading as infrastructure.
The crisis is deepened further by how LNG is financed. Bangladesh buys LNG on the volatile international spot market, requiring immediate payment, so as foreign exchange reserves shrink, securing timely cargoes becomes harder. Payment delays directly translate into supply delays, explaining this week’s shortage, not a technological breakdown, but a cargo that simply didn’t arrive on time.
What the Summit Resumption Achieves
The restoration of supply through Summit’s terminal is an essential stabiliser. The gradual ramping up to 550 mmcfd will ease pressure on power generation and industrial production, both of which suffer immediate and visible damage when gas supply drops. Summit’s commitment to maximising delivery within technical and transmission constraints is a responsible corporate response, and it underscores the role that private operators play in keeping the national grid functional during periods of acute shortage. Yet this resumption is a treatment of symptoms, not a cure of the disease. The system remains one cargo delay away from repeat disruption.
Short Term Survival: What the Government Must Do Now
In the immediate term, the government must ensure that LNG procurement contracts are structured to guarantee a baseline volume of supply regardless of spot market fluctuations. Long term supply agreements with multiple exporting nations, rather than reliance on spot purchases alone, would provide the predictability that the current arrangement lacks. Second, the contractual and operational coordination between the two FSRU operators must be strengthened so that maintenance schedules and technical faults at one terminal do not coincide with supply interruptions at the other. Third, the government must prioritise the allocation of foreign exchange for energy imports, shielding LNG payments from the broader pressures on the reserve. Industrial shutdowns and power deficits cost the economy far more than the foreign exchange saved by delaying a cargo.
Toward a Longer Term Sustainable Solution
The path toward sustainability requires Bangladesh to diversify both its energy sources and infrastructure. An onshore LNG terminal, less exposed to weather and maritime disruptions than floating units, should be prioritized and expedited. The gas transmission network needs expansion and modernization so supply disruptions at any single point don’t create nationwide bottlenecks. Domestic offshore gas reserves, still underexplored, deserve renewed investment and political urgency, since no import arrangement can permanently replace indigenous supply.
Beyond gas, Bangladesh must speed up its shift toward energy sources independent of imported fuel. Solar power, well suited to the country’s geography, needs stronger policy backing and grid integration, while improved energy efficiency standards for industry and buildings could ease overall demand on the gas system. A national energy strategy treating gas as transitional rather than permanent would better balance immediate needs with long term sustainability.
Ultimately, the gas crisis reflects failures in governance, planning, and vision, not just supply. Summit’s resumption of LNG delivery has bought Bangladesh time, but how that time is used will determine whether the country remains in crisis or finally achieves energy stability.
