Tanzina Fardoush
Managing Editor, Oniket Research Group
Bangladesh’s private television sector has grown quickly, but as the preceding discussion makes clear, growth in reach has not been matched by growth in institutional safeguards for accuracy and independence. Fixing this gap is not primarily a matter of individual journalists trying harder. It is a matter of institutions, government and independent alike, building frameworks that allow accuracy, accountability, and editorial independence to become the norm rather than the exception. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Press Council, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, and other bodies each have a distinct part to play in this longer-term project.
The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
The Ministry currently functions largely as a licensing and oversight authority, and this gatekeeping role gives it significant leverage that could be redirected toward quality rather than political control. Instead of using licensing renewal as an implicit tool of political pressure, the Ministry could tie renewal to demonstrable newsroom standards: the presence of a functioning verification desk, a published correction policy, and basic training requirements for reporting staff.
A transparent, published set of licensing criteria, applied consistently regardless of a channel’s political leanings, would do more to improve quality than any single content regulation. The Ministry could also convene an annual public review of channel performance against these criteria, creating a reputational incentive for compliance that operates independently of political favor.
An Independent Press and Broadcast Council
Bangladesh already has a Press Council, but it is widely regarded as underpowered, underfunded, and largely focused on print media complaints rather than broadcast standards. A revitalized council, structured with genuine independence from the executive branch and staffed by a mix of senior journalists, media scholars, and civil society representatives rather than political appointees, could take on the ombudsman function that the BBC model demonstrates so effectively. Such a body needs real authority: the power to compel on air corrections, publish findings on upheld complaints, and issue public rulings that carry reputational weight even without punitive fines. Complaint adjudication should be fast, transparent, and published, so that both viewers and channels can see a track record building over time.
The Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and Licensing Bodies
The regulatory commission that oversees broadcast infrastructure has a role that goes beyond spectrum allocation. It can require, as a condition of continued operation, that channels disclose ownership structures and any material business interests connected to their owners, information that is currently often opaque to viewers. Ownership transparency would not eliminate bias, but it would let audiences evaluate coverage with fuller context, much as disclosure requirements function in financial journalism internationally.
The Commission could also mandate a minimum separation between a channel’s news division and its commercial or political ownership, for example through editorial charters that outline decision making authorities independent of proprietors on day-to-day news judgments.
Journalist Training and Professional Standards Bodies
Longer term improvement also depends on strengthening the professional infrastructure around journalism itself. Universities, journalism associations, and independent training institutes can partner with international broadcasters to build verification and fact checking curricula into both academic programs and mid-career training. A professional accreditation system, administered independently of government, could set baseline competency expectations and offer journalists a credential that increases their standing and, over time, their ability to resist editorial pressure from owners or political actors.
Civil Society, Media Literacy, and Independent Watchdogs
Government action alone will not be sufficient, and an overreliance on state authority carries its own risks given the current climate of legal pressure on journalists. Independent watchdog organizations, similar to fact checking initiatives seen elsewhere in South Asia, can monitor channels for factual accuracy and publish findings without government involvement, preserving credibility with skeptical audiences.
Media literacy campaigns run through schools and civil society organizations can build public demand for higher standards, since audience pressure is often a more durable driver of change than regulation imposed from above. As viewers become more attuned to sourcing, framing, and verification, channels have stronger commercial incentive to invest in these practices themselves.
Coordinating the Pieces
None of these actors can succeed alone. The Ministry sets licensing incentives, an independent council enforces standards and issues public rulings, the telecommunications regulator ensures transparency around ownership, professional bodies build journalist capacity, and civil society sustains public demand for accountability. The common thread running through all these reforms is independence from direct political control, since regulatory bodies that are themselves seen as instruments of the ruling party cannot credibly demand accountability from broadcasters.
Bangladesh does not lack talented journalists or capable institutions in embryonic form. What it lacks is the sustained, coordinated, and genuinely independent institutional architecture that allows those talents to translate into consistently reliable news. Building that architecture is a multi-year project, but it is the only route toward closing the gap between Bangladesh’s private television sector and the global standards it aspires to match.
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