Md. Abrar Tazwar Rijon
Lecturer, Department of Geography and Environment, Pabna University of Science and Technology
A recent article in the Oniket Bulletin argued that the blue economy is not only a coastal story. That argument matters most in the north, in districts such as Panchagarh, Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Naogaon and Chapainawabganj. Rivers like the Teesta, Dharla, Atrai and Punarbhaba, together with countless ponds and seasonal floodplains, run beside an international border there.
These districts have water, land and labour. What they lack is security, market access and attention from Dhaka. Whether the blue economy lifts them or bypasses them depends on how those gaps are closed.
A Region Still Catching Up
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) data show how much is at stake. In the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2022, poverty in Rangpur fell from 47 per cent in 2016 to 24.8 per cent, still above the national rate of 18.7 per cent. Lower poverty has not meant secure diets: the BBS Food Security Statistics 2023 placed Rangpur at the top of the food insecurity index.
The BBS Sample Vital Statistics 2021 found over 44 per cent of Rangpur households in the poorest wealth quintile, the highest of any division. Meanwhile, fisheries grew 11.05 per cent in FY24 and 15.79 per cent in the latest provisional estimate, even as overall agricultural growth fell. A region with thin industry and persistent food insecurity has every reason to claim a share.
Smuggling and the Search for Legal Livelihoods
Border districts run partly on informal trade, especially in cattle, and reports from Lalmonirhat describe cattle traders shot along the border. Smuggling persists where legal livelihoods are scarce. Hatcheries, feed mills, ice plants and cold storage create steady work close to home, giving young men an alternative to risky night crossings. The opposite outcome is also possible. A fisheries boom with no legal export channels and no fair prices could simply feed the informal economy. Traceability and certification would help separate lawful trade from illicit flows.
Border Conflict and Shared Rivers
Violence shapes daily life. Ain o Salish Kendra reports 34 Bangladeshis killed by India’s Border Security Force in 2025, and at least 296 over the past decade. Such risks deter investment. These killings are, first of all, a rights and diplomatic failure that Dhaka must raise directly with New Delhi. Fish ponds cannot solve them, and presenting livelihood projects as the answer shifts the burden onto border residents.
Rivers add another layer. Northern rivers are transboundary, so dry season flows depend on decisions made upstream, and the Teesta water sharing deal remains long delayed. River fisheries and dry season ponds cannot thrive without predictable flows. Fishing communities near the line also need clear rules on access to waters that touch the border, so that a livelihood is not treated as trespass.
Floods add the opposite risk. In Kurigram and Lalmonirhat, one monsoon flood can overtop ponds and wash out a season’s stock, and erosion along the Brahmaputra and Teesta can take a pond or hatchery within a few seasons. Raised dykes, net fencing, flood-indexed insurance and erosion-aware siting must come with any pond scheme.
Remoteness and the Cost of Distance
Rangpur division lies far from Dhaka and farther still from Chattogram and Mongla ports. Perishable fish lose value on long journeys, and middlemen capture much of what remains. Cold chains and processing units near production areas therefore matter most here. Local processing keeps value and jobs in the district rather than exporting them to the capital. Digital platforms linking farmers directly to buyers would cut the distance further. Reform of public water leasing matters just as much, since in remote districts influential bidders can dominate with little scrutiny.
The normative prescription
Progress begins with putting investment where the need is greatest. The poverty map developed by BBS, the World Bank and the World Food Programme can show which upazilas should receive hatcheries, cold storage and training first. Investment guided by evidence is far more likely to reach left-behind border communities than investment guided by convenience.
That investment will only hold if border management and development are treated as one task. Coordination between Border Guard Bangladesh and the civil administration can protect legitimate fishing and transport near the frontier, so that a farmer going about lawful business is not mistaken for a smuggler. Bangladesh should also press for shared river management that treats flow, fish migration and floodplain health as joint interests.
Finally, security and infrastructure must be matched by finance and skills. Credit, insurance that covers flood and erosion losses, and training that reach border communities, especially women and youth, would make legal enterprise the more attractive choice. When fish farming offers a reliable income close to home, the pull of the smuggler’s route weakens without any need for force.
Conclusion
The blue economy will not reach the northern border on its own. Without safety, fair access and nearby infrastructure, its gains will flow to better connected districts, and informal trade will keep filling the gap. With them, the rivers and ponds beside the border could anchor stable local incomes and reduce the pull of the smuggler’s route. The north has waited long enough to be treated as an afterthought. The blue economy is a chance to treat it as a frontier of opportunity instead.
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